Global diplomacy has been thrown in a flux as US President Donald Trump's transactional policies are forcing new alliances as old ones weaken. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to Japan and China come when the Indo-Pacific region faces great uncertainty due to Trump's apathy towards alliances, particularly the Quad, a grouping of US, Australia, Japan and India against China, which he had himself launched in 2017.
With PM Modi visiting Japan against the backdrop of a rapidly changing geopolitical climate, a critical question looms large: can India, Japan and Australia - three key Indo-Pacific democracies - forge deeper trilateral cooperation as the Quad begins to lose coherence under Trump?
Just before PM Modi's visit to Japan, Japan’s trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa cancelled a planned visit to the US at the last minute on Thursday. Akazawa was scheduled to formalise in the US confirmation of a $550 billion investment package offered by Japan to the US to ease the punitive Trump tariffs. The negotiator was scheduled to discuss financial details of the package, such as the split of returns between the two countries. However, Japan said that some points still needed to be discussed at the administrative level with the US. Japan had earlier rebutted Trump's claim about the nature of the said investment. The cancellation of Akazawa's visit to the US right ahead of Modi's visit to Japan was seen as meaningful by many.
Also Read| PM Modi's balancing act: Wooing Japan, resetting China ties, and navigating Trump's tariffs
Two days before Modi left for Japan, Australian foreign minister Penny Wong spoke against Trump's tariff policy. Though she refrained from commenting on India-US relations and emphasised that both the countries were friends to Australia, she said Australia did not support tariffs and believes that openness can enable growth.
A new diplomatic crossroads
The cancellation of the Japanese trade negotiator's US trip and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s public criticism of Trump’s tariff policy signal rising discomfort among America’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific. These developments, coinciding with Modi’s twin visits to Japan and China, underline a moment of recalibration, not of alliances per se but of strategic priorities and tactical flexibility.
The three US allies in the Indo-Pacific -- India, Japan and Australia -- find themselves targeted by Trump's increasingly protectionist economic policies. Trump has imposed 10% tariffs on Australia despite its free trade agreement with the US, besides a universal 50% tariff on steel and aluminium hitting Australia badly. Australia is now worried about Trump's threat to impose a 250% tariff on pharmaceuticals. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has not yet secured a face‑to‑face meeting with Trump, despite eight months having passed since Trump’s election win. A meeting was expected to occur on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Canada but it was abruptly cancelled when Trump left the summit early due to escalating tensions between Israel and Iran. To pave the way for that elusive meeting, Australia’s Defence Minister and Deputy PM Richard Marles recently rushed to Washington. Australia recently recognised the Palestinian state, a decision that did not go down well with Washington.
Albanese even visited China in July in a strategic effort to reset bilateral relations with Australia’s largest trading partner as well as a security challenge, likely
prompted by Trump’s protectionist policies and inconsistent approach to its close allies. Remarkably, Albanese has met Chinese President Xi Jinping before he is able to meet Trump.
Japan too is not happy with Trump's strong-arm tactics despite reaching an agreement over a trade deal with the US. It has expressed disagreements with Washington over a proposed $550 billion investment package and paused crucial negotiations. There are clear signs of diplomatic thaw between China and Japan recently -- economic dialogues, relaxed travel restrictions, resumed trade and multilateral engagements -- even though strategic and security concerns continue to cast a long shadow and mistrust persists.
Also Read| India’s careful choreography avoids ruffling Japan while managing China
Quad: An alliance under stress
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was envisioned as a strategic bulwark in the Indo-Pacific, meant to promote a rules-based order and counterbalance China’s assertiveness. However, with Trump's preference for bilateralism and transactional diplomacy, the Quad’s collective relevance is under threat.
Rather than leveraging the grouping to advance multilateral cooperation, Trump appears more interested in extracting individual concessions. This shift significantly undermines the Quad's value proposition as a cohesive platform. While the scheduled Quad Summit in New Delhi later this year still stands, there is growing uncertainty about its viability or effectiveness in the current context. Some even doubt if Trump would be able to visit India to attend the summit if acrimony between the two countries persisted.
The logic for closer India-Japan-Australia coordination
Despite the drift in the Quad’s centrality, there are compelling reasons for India, Japan and Australia to intensify their trilateral cooperation. They have a shared experience of Trump’s strong-arm diplomacy. All three countries are on the receiving end of Trump’s aggressive trade tactics. This shared experience creates a platform for mutual understanding and cooperation in navigating economic disruptions.
Regardless of their current tensions with Washington, Japan and Australia remain deeply invested in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, an objective India also shares. Increased trilateral cooperation could act as a hedge against uncertainties stemming from both China’s assertiveness and US unpredictability. The India-Japan-Australia trilateral cooperation won't be an entirely new concept. Over the years, the three have held dialogues and engagements. Strengthening this format could allow them to coordinate more nimbly in response to regional challenges.
With trade disruptions from the US and the need to reduce overdependence on China, the three countries have an incentive to explore deeper trade, investment and technology cooperation among themselves. This could take the form of alternative supply chains, joint R&D ventures and digital trade frameworks.
The limits of realignment
While India has more strategic flexibility, shown by its renewed outreach to China and strong ties with Russia, Japan and Australia remain deeply intertwined with the US, both economically and militarily. US military bases in Japan and Australia, intelligence-sharing under Five Eyes and the AUKUS pact all bind them tightly to Washington. Despite their growing discomfort, neither Tokyo nor Canberra is in a position to drift away from the US. Instead, what is likely is a quiet hedging strategy: increasing diplomatic and economic engagements with regional partners, without jeopardising their security relationships with Washington. In Japan’s case, recent signs of thaw with China do not indicate a strategic pivot but rather a pragmatic balancing act. Australia’s China reset is similarly cautious, focused more on stabilising economic ties than on altering its security alignments.
The future of the Quad under Trump’s second term is uncertain. If the US continues to prioritise transactional, zero-sum approaches, the grouping risks becoming dysfunctional. In such a scenario, a stronger trilateral mechanism between India, Japan and Australia could emerge as a functional alternative for regional cooperation.
However, this would not be a replacement for the US-led order, but rather a complementary hedge, a flexible mini-lateral that could keep the spirit of the Indo-Pacific vision alive even as the Quad drifts. Yet, this effort would require a fine diplomatic balance, careful not to alienate the US while building new forms of resilience.
India, Japan, and Australia stand at a crucial juncture. Trump’s transactional approach has disrupted old certainties but also opened up new possibilities. A deeper trilateral partnership among these nations could provide stability and strategic coherence in an increasingly fragmented Indo-Pacific. However, such a partnership would have to be carefully calibrated, not as an anti-US or anti-China bloc but as a constructive, autonomous initiative focused on regional security, economic resilience and multilateral cooperation. In an era of diplomatic flux, quiet coordination rather than formal alliances may become the most effective path forward.
With PM Modi visiting Japan against the backdrop of a rapidly changing geopolitical climate, a critical question looms large: can India, Japan and Australia - three key Indo-Pacific democracies - forge deeper trilateral cooperation as the Quad begins to lose coherence under Trump?
Just before PM Modi's visit to Japan, Japan’s trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa cancelled a planned visit to the US at the last minute on Thursday. Akazawa was scheduled to formalise in the US confirmation of a $550 billion investment package offered by Japan to the US to ease the punitive Trump tariffs. The negotiator was scheduled to discuss financial details of the package, such as the split of returns between the two countries. However, Japan said that some points still needed to be discussed at the administrative level with the US. Japan had earlier rebutted Trump's claim about the nature of the said investment. The cancellation of Akazawa's visit to the US right ahead of Modi's visit to Japan was seen as meaningful by many.
Also Read| PM Modi's balancing act: Wooing Japan, resetting China ties, and navigating Trump's tariffs
Two days before Modi left for Japan, Australian foreign minister Penny Wong spoke against Trump's tariff policy. Though she refrained from commenting on India-US relations and emphasised that both the countries were friends to Australia, she said Australia did not support tariffs and believes that openness can enable growth.
A new diplomatic crossroads
The cancellation of the Japanese trade negotiator's US trip and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s public criticism of Trump’s tariff policy signal rising discomfort among America’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific. These developments, coinciding with Modi’s twin visits to Japan and China, underline a moment of recalibration, not of alliances per se but of strategic priorities and tactical flexibility.
The three US allies in the Indo-Pacific -- India, Japan and Australia -- find themselves targeted by Trump's increasingly protectionist economic policies. Trump has imposed 10% tariffs on Australia despite its free trade agreement with the US, besides a universal 50% tariff on steel and aluminium hitting Australia badly. Australia is now worried about Trump's threat to impose a 250% tariff on pharmaceuticals. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has not yet secured a face‑to‑face meeting with Trump, despite eight months having passed since Trump’s election win. A meeting was expected to occur on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Canada but it was abruptly cancelled when Trump left the summit early due to escalating tensions between Israel and Iran. To pave the way for that elusive meeting, Australia’s Defence Minister and Deputy PM Richard Marles recently rushed to Washington. Australia recently recognised the Palestinian state, a decision that did not go down well with Washington.
Albanese even visited China in July in a strategic effort to reset bilateral relations with Australia’s largest trading partner as well as a security challenge, likely
prompted by Trump’s protectionist policies and inconsistent approach to its close allies. Remarkably, Albanese has met Chinese President Xi Jinping before he is able to meet Trump.
Japan too is not happy with Trump's strong-arm tactics despite reaching an agreement over a trade deal with the US. It has expressed disagreements with Washington over a proposed $550 billion investment package and paused crucial negotiations. There are clear signs of diplomatic thaw between China and Japan recently -- economic dialogues, relaxed travel restrictions, resumed trade and multilateral engagements -- even though strategic and security concerns continue to cast a long shadow and mistrust persists.
Also Read| India’s careful choreography avoids ruffling Japan while managing China
Quad: An alliance under stress
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was envisioned as a strategic bulwark in the Indo-Pacific, meant to promote a rules-based order and counterbalance China’s assertiveness. However, with Trump's preference for bilateralism and transactional diplomacy, the Quad’s collective relevance is under threat.
Rather than leveraging the grouping to advance multilateral cooperation, Trump appears more interested in extracting individual concessions. This shift significantly undermines the Quad's value proposition as a cohesive platform. While the scheduled Quad Summit in New Delhi later this year still stands, there is growing uncertainty about its viability or effectiveness in the current context. Some even doubt if Trump would be able to visit India to attend the summit if acrimony between the two countries persisted.
The logic for closer India-Japan-Australia coordination
Despite the drift in the Quad’s centrality, there are compelling reasons for India, Japan and Australia to intensify their trilateral cooperation. They have a shared experience of Trump’s strong-arm diplomacy. All three countries are on the receiving end of Trump’s aggressive trade tactics. This shared experience creates a platform for mutual understanding and cooperation in navigating economic disruptions.
Regardless of their current tensions with Washington, Japan and Australia remain deeply invested in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, an objective India also shares. Increased trilateral cooperation could act as a hedge against uncertainties stemming from both China’s assertiveness and US unpredictability. The India-Japan-Australia trilateral cooperation won't be an entirely new concept. Over the years, the three have held dialogues and engagements. Strengthening this format could allow them to coordinate more nimbly in response to regional challenges.
With trade disruptions from the US and the need to reduce overdependence on China, the three countries have an incentive to explore deeper trade, investment and technology cooperation among themselves. This could take the form of alternative supply chains, joint R&D ventures and digital trade frameworks.
The limits of realignment
While India has more strategic flexibility, shown by its renewed outreach to China and strong ties with Russia, Japan and Australia remain deeply intertwined with the US, both economically and militarily. US military bases in Japan and Australia, intelligence-sharing under Five Eyes and the AUKUS pact all bind them tightly to Washington. Despite their growing discomfort, neither Tokyo nor Canberra is in a position to drift away from the US. Instead, what is likely is a quiet hedging strategy: increasing diplomatic and economic engagements with regional partners, without jeopardising their security relationships with Washington. In Japan’s case, recent signs of thaw with China do not indicate a strategic pivot but rather a pragmatic balancing act. Australia’s China reset is similarly cautious, focused more on stabilising economic ties than on altering its security alignments.
The future of the Quad under Trump’s second term is uncertain. If the US continues to prioritise transactional, zero-sum approaches, the grouping risks becoming dysfunctional. In such a scenario, a stronger trilateral mechanism between India, Japan and Australia could emerge as a functional alternative for regional cooperation.
However, this would not be a replacement for the US-led order, but rather a complementary hedge, a flexible mini-lateral that could keep the spirit of the Indo-Pacific vision alive even as the Quad drifts. Yet, this effort would require a fine diplomatic balance, careful not to alienate the US while building new forms of resilience.
India, Japan, and Australia stand at a crucial juncture. Trump’s transactional approach has disrupted old certainties but also opened up new possibilities. A deeper trilateral partnership among these nations could provide stability and strategic coherence in an increasingly fragmented Indo-Pacific. However, such a partnership would have to be carefully calibrated, not as an anti-US or anti-China bloc but as a constructive, autonomous initiative focused on regional security, economic resilience and multilateral cooperation. In an era of diplomatic flux, quiet coordination rather than formal alliances may become the most effective path forward.
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